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Summary 
 
This paper describe and explain citizens’ and civil servants’ perceptions of how able 
government bodies are to prevent and handle crises. The explanatory factors are trust, 
cultural, political, structural and demographic features. The empirical data base is two 
Norwegian surveys, one to the citizens and one to civil servants.  The major findings are 
that citizens have a rather high general trust in government ability to handle and prevent 
crises and that there are no big differences between the general public and the 
government regarding their perception of crisis management. Political efficacy is the 
main explanatory variable among the citizens and policy area, perceived coordinative 
capability and mutual trust among the civil servants. 
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Sammendrag 
 
Dette notatet beskriver og forklarer oppfatninger i befolkningen og blant ansatte i 
norske sentraladministrasjon om hvilken kompetanse myndighetene har til å forebygge 
og håndtere kriser og ulykker. Forklaringsfaktorene er tillit, kulturelle, politiske, 
strukturelle og demografiske faktorer. Det empiriske datagrunnlaget er to 
spørreundersøkelser som ble gjennomført i 2006-2007, den ene til et representativt 
utvalg av befolkningen og det andre til ansatte i norske departementer og direktorater. 
Studien viser at befolkningen i nokså stor grad mener at myndighetene er i stand til å 
håndtere og forebygge kriser og ulykker. Det er heller ingen stor forskjell mellom 
befolkningen og de offentlig ansatte når det gjelder deres oppfatninger om 
myndighetenes kompetanse på dette området. Politisk involvering er den viktigste 
forklaringsfaktoren blant befolkningen, mens politikkområde, opplevd samordningsevne 
og gjensidig tillit er viktigst blant de ansatte i sentraladministrasjonen. 
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Introduction 
In this paper we will address how public executives perceive the capacity of the state 
apparatus to prevent and handle crises, accidents and catastrophes and how the same 
capacity is assessed by the general public1. Capacity is related to factors like ability, 
competence, preparedness, organization and trust. 
Today the world is perceived as increasingly insecure and dangerous for a number of 
reasons. The concerns raised by 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks have had 
important repercussions for public-sector reforms in many countries (Halligan and 
Adams 2004: 85-86, Kettl  2003). More and more countries are concerned about bio-
security, crises, disasters - like tsunamis, or pandemics - like SARS or bird flu 
(Christensen and Painter 2004). This has led to a tightening-up of government. Crises 
make it easier to argue for reassertion of the centre and increased coordination 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2007). The new threat of terrorism has underlined the 
importance of governments’ avoiding contradictory outcomes and ensuring that 
information is shared between agencies and between administrative levels in multi-
governance systems. This development also affects the relationship between citizens and 
government, including trust and legitimacy. Expectations among the general public 
about what security government can and should offer its citizens are changing, and trust 
between citizens and government has been undermined. Thus both intergovernmental 
relations and the relations between citizens and government face new challenges.  
Organizations are the critical actors in risk management because they both process 
and handle risks and are also potential producers of risk. In the words of Short and 
Clarke (1992) they are simultaneously processors and neglecters of risk. Thus our 
analytical focus is on organizations and organizing. How organizations such as 
government agencies and ministries experience their own capacity to organize might be 
important for understanding how they handle risk (Hutter and Power 2005). When a 
crisis strikes, the political-administrative leadership will first try to define and interpret 
the crisis, and only then assess its capacity (Boin et al. 2005). Capacity assessment 
implies prioritizing resources, but also handling intra- and inter-organizational 
coordination and understanding the various technologies used in different public and 
private organizations.  
Organizations have always been susceptible to uncertainty in the form of external 
shocks. But such shocks also reveal organizational weaknesses, since organizing for 
routine activities seldom prepares them for crisis. In recent years there has also been a 
growing recognition of organizations and processes of organizing as significant sources 
of risk. 
                                                 
1 Concepts such as risk, crisis, accidents, disasters and catastrophes have different meaning and definitions (see Boin 
2005, Perry and Quarantelli 2005). We will in this article not make a clear distinction between them but address the 
broad field of internal security and crises management more generally. 
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Man-made and manufactured risks have received more attention in the risk-
management literature (Turner and Pidgeon 1997, Beck 1992) and the interdependency 
of the various levels of risk-processing suggests that regulatory regimes are embedded in 
organizations, which pre-define them (Morgan and Engwall 1999).  
How organizations such as ministries and central agencies experience their own capacity 
and competence to prevent and manage risks and crises is important for understanding 
how they handle crises. But in a representative democracy it is also important to know 
how the general public assesses the government's ability to prevent and handle crises 
and accidents; that assessment, in turn, is dependent on how the government defines 
crises and accidents, what information is given, ‘the generation of meaning’, whether the 
leadership engages in blame-avoidance and on learning processes in government (Boin 
et al. 2005). If there is a big gap between what citizens expect the government to do, 
based on their assessment of ability, competence and former crises, and what 
government executives think that they are able to do, there might be a legitimacy 
problem. 
We will address such problems by focusing on the case of Norway. Our main 
research goal is to describe and explain citizens’ and civil servants' perceptions of how 
able government bodies are to prevent and handle crises and accidents. The empirical 
data base is two surveys. The first is a questionnaire given to a representative sample of 
the population about citizens’ attitudes to government and governmental activities. The 
second is a questionnaire given to civil servants in all ministries and central agencies. 
The citizens were asked how they assessed the government’s ability to prevent and 
handle various crises and accidents, and the government executives were asked how well 
prepared their organization was to prevent and handle various crises, accidents and 
catastrophes.  
We start by giving a brief outline of the Norwegian context both generally and in this 
specific policy area. We then go on to present our theoretical approach to explaining 
citizens’ and civil servants’ perceptions of the ability of government to prevent and 
handle crises. For the citizens we will emphasize broad explanatory factors such as 
demographic features, trust and political factors. For the civil servants we will focus on 
structural, cultural and demographic features. In the third part of the paper we will 
present our empirical data. We will start by describing how the government's ability to 
prevent and handle various risks and crises is perceived by the general public and by 
government officials. In the next empirical section we will analyze variations in the 
perception of crisis management in the population and among civil servants. In the 
discussion and conclusion we will outline and interpret our main empirical findings and 
discuss some implications. 
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The Norwegian Context 
The  b r oad  p i c t u r e  
Norway is a small, multiparty parliamentary state. In a comparative perspective, it has a 
strong democratic tradition and relatively strong collectivistic and egalitarian values, is 
consensus-oriented and has well-developed corporatist arrangements. The regime’s 
performance, support for democracy and the level of trust in public institutions are 
generally higher than in most other countries (Norris 1999, Christensen and Lægreid 
2005), as is the general level of trust in society (Rothstein and Stolle 2003). Surveys of 
political support for the national government nearly always accord Norway a leading 
position (Listhaug 1998).  
The public sector in Norway is large, due mainly to a large, universal welfare state, 
and there is a relatively high level of mutual trust among public-sector organizations. 
Privatization reforms have been reluctant, but some critical infrastructure such as 
telecommunication has been partly privatized. Norway is a unitary state with a 
combination of political and administrative decentralization. The central government in 
Norway is characterized by strong sector ministries and relatively weak supra-ministries 
with coordination responsibilities across ministerial areas (Christensen 2003). The 
relationships between parliament, ministers and agencies are based on the principle of 
ministerial responsibility, meaning that the minister is responsible to the parliament for 
all activities within his or her policy areas in the ministry as well as in subordinate bodies 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2002). The principle of local self-government is also pretty 
strong. There are elected bodies at both local and regional level which are expected to 
make and implement their own local policy without too much interference from central 
government but also to implement policy decided at the central level. The delivery of 
the most important welfare services is delegated to the municipalities. Added to this, 
there are also government bodies at both local and regional level that are responsible for 
implementing central government policy; and these also have tasks related to crisis 
management and internal security.  
 
The  I n t e rna l  S e cu r i t y  F i e l d  
In Norway a main principle for crisis management is the principle of responsibility, which 
states that each ministry and government agency has responsibility for internal security 
within its own field. This means that public-sector organizations responsible for a sector 
or a policy area are also responsible for the safety, security and preparedness of that 
sector. Thus a mainstay in the field of civil security is the idea of internal self-regulation 
in the various public bodies and policy areas. The idea of the government is that 
flexibility and adaptability in the field of security can be guaranteed by making it an 
integral part of the various substantive policy fields. The reverse side of the coin, 
however, is that if everybody holds responsibility, nobody does. Accordingly, the central 
civil security field is quite complex and fragmented, entailing a risk of over-division of 
responsibility in security matters and ignorance of these aspects in the various policy 
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areas. What is more, internal security also has to compete for attention and resources 
with other important tasks. 
Until the Ministry of Justice took over the main responsibility for coordinating 
Norwegian civil security in 1994 in order to increase the horizontal coordination in the 
field, there was no superior body in this field. However, even then, the overall 
responsibility assigned to the ministry was rather weak, both formally and in practice 
(Høydal 2007). Nevertheless, the Ministry of Justice does have some horizontal 
coordination tasks across ministerial areas, and its subordinate agency – The Directorate 
of Civil Protection and Emergency Planning – has authority delegated to it in this 
respect. There is also extensive civil-military cooperation with the Ministry of Defence 
and its subordinate agency the Norwegian National Security Authority. On the regional 
level the county governors (the prefects) have a central coordination role across sectors 
in the area of crisis management.  
The principle of subsidiarity is also important for the government in the field of crisis 
management and internal security. This means that intervention at higher administrative 
levels must be seen as subsidiary to the obligations of units at lower levels and implies 
an emphasis on decentralization and diversity. Crises are supposed to be handled at the 
lowest possible level, because this level is deemed to be best informed about the crisis or 
problem. This gives local government important responsibilities. A dilemma here, 
however, is that when crises occur there is normally a simultaneous need for strong 
central leadership and a high degree of local discretion and autonomy to handle the 
crisis on the ground.  
A third major principle is the principle of similarity, which implies that the 
organizational structures used in crisis situations should be as similar as possible to the 
regular normal structures. While this potentially contributes to standardization gains it 
also lacks the flexibility required to deal with a variety of situations. A fourth principle is 
the principle of collaboration, which implies cooperation between public-sector authorities 
and private-sector organizations in crisis situations. When accidents and crises occur 
civil society organizations are supposed to offer their resources. This represents a kind 
of public-private partnership and joined-up government feature. 
Over the last decade Norway has avoided any major disasters or catastrophes and we 
will expect that this will affect the way citizens look at their government in this policy 
area, and also the way civil servants assess their own capability. Some accidents and 
crises of smaller scale and scope have, however, occurred during this period. The 
passenger ship Sleipner, which went down on the west coast in 1999 (15 people dead), is 
one example. Others are the Rocknes shipwreck in 2004 (18 people dead) and the train 
accident at Åsta in 2000 (19 dead). In addition catastrophes that have occurred outside 
Norway have also affected Norwegian citizens and the Norwegian authorities: for 
example, 84 Norwegians were killed in the Tsunami in South-East Asia in 2004. Deaths 
have also been caused by avalanches and as a result of epidemics caused by the e.coli 
(2006) and giardia (2005) bacteria. In addition, there have been natural disasters, such as 
the hurricane on the west coast in 1992 and the flooding in eastern Norway in 1995, 
both without any casualties, but with big material damage. Although they have not 
reached Norway, the SARS and bird flu epidemics have also had an effect on 
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Norwegian public discourse as well as on the authorities. Likewise the terrorist attacks in 
the US (9/11) and the bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). 
Some of these accidents have led to the reorganization of government crisis 
management organizations (Fjell 2007), while others have not. The government 
launched a reorganization of the central apparatus for internal security in 1999 by 
appointing a public commission to assess the vulnerability of Norwegian society. The 
commission’s report was submitted to the Ministry of Justice in 2000 (NOU 2000:24). 
One of the commission’s main proposals was to improve vertical and horizontal co-
ordination in the security administration by establishing a new special ministry of 
internal security. These recommendations were not, however, approved by the 
government in the White Paper presented to parliament in 2002 (St.meld. no 17 (2001-
2002)). Somewhat surprisingly, the process resulted in only minor changes in the 
security administration (Lægreid and Serigstad 2006, Serigstad 2003).  
Ultimately a hierarchical model of this kind proved to be too radical for the 
ministries involved, and the government favored an upgrading and strengthening of the 
agencies in the field. In contrast to the major dispute that took place over the 
organizational model, there was overall agreement about what the problems were in the 
field of internal security. Most of the bodies and actors involved acknowledged the 
problems of fragmentation, weak co-ordination and low priority assigned to internal 
security, but no agreement on a radical organizational solution was possible. 
The process revealed a conflict over how to define internal security. Disagreement 
between the justice and defense sectors over how to define security and preparation for 
emergencies and about where to place responsibility for them became most pronounced 
during the governmental process and in the parliamentary reading. The compromise was 
to abandon the radical solution of creating a new ministry and to go some way towards 
strengthening the coordinating responsibility of the Ministry of Justice by merging two 
agencies into a new Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and by 
having the National Security Authority report to the Ministry of Justice in civilian cases 
while continuing to be administratively subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The 
solution chosen involved a lot of path-dependency, and it balanced horizontal 
coordinative features with a degree of fragmentation and increase in the autonomy of 
the main internal security agency.  
 
Theoretical approach 
Our theoretical approach will be two-fold: we will first present perspectives which may 
be helpful for understanding and explaining citizens` perception of the capability of the 
authorities both to prevent and to handle what can be termed “internal security”. We 
will proceed by presenting an approach that will help us understand why civil servants 
perceive their own ability in the field as they do. First, however, we will briefly discuss 
the concept of “internal security” and explain how we have operationalized the concept 
as a dependent variable in our study. 
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I n t e rna l  s e cu r i t y   
The concept of “internal security” is an ambiguous term, which has gained currency 
since 9/11 (Kettl 2004). Covering such concepts as “domestic security”, “civil defence”, 
“homeland security”, ”societal security” “societal safety” and “civil emergencies”, it can 
be defined in broad or narrow terms. In narrow terms it can be taken to mean 
intentional or unintentional human activities involving "man-made" risks that affect the 
social and natural environment, including terrorist attacks. It can, however, also be 
extended to include unpredictable natural disasters like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, 
floods, tsunamis and hurricanes (Smith 2006:2-6). In Norway the tendency is to regard 
internal security in broader terms and over the past ten years the term societal safety has 
gained currency as a general concept (Olsen, Kruke and Hovden 2007)2. In this article 
we will distinguish between two dimensions of crisis management: cause of crisis: man-
made or of natural origin, and phases of crisis. Most scholars distinguish between four 
phases of crises management: prevention, preparation, mitigation and aftermath (Boin et 
al. 2005). We will however only differentiate between prevention and handling of a 
crisis.  
 
Table 1. A typology of crisis and crisis management. 
  Cause of crisis 
  Man-made Of natural origin 
Prevention   Phase of crisis 
 Handling   
 
It is more or less impossible to prevent natural disasters and catastrophes, such as 
avalanches, earthquakes and hurricanes. But it is not impossible to prevent the crises 
that follow from them. It is also not always easy to separate natural causes from man-
made causes of crises (Smith 2006:6). Often there might be a combination, such as 
accidents in the field of transportation. A central challenge in this policy field is to 
balance the need for increased prevention against the need for a stronger response and a 
strategy of resilience (Wildavsky 2003). Our dependent variables will reflect this 
distinction. There is also a wider democratic challenge related to strong or in some cases 
"draconian" prevention measures, as seen in the debate about stronger anti-terrorist 
laws in the US, the UK and Australia. 
 
                                                 
2 In this article we will not pay a great attention to the difference between safety and security, but we are aware of the 
fact that they are rather specific and different concepts with fairly large and big research communities behind them.  
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C i t i z en s ’  a s se s smen t s  o f  c r i s i s  managemen t  
In a representative democratic system it is very important that the way the authorities 
solve problems and handle tasks is accepted and trusted by the general public. This also 
applies to crisis management and internal security-tasks. The authorities need the 
acceptance, support and sometimes even the assistance from and help of citizens. In the 
security field, which by nature does not generally involve routine tasks, and which 
sometimes requires an immediate response from the authorities, it can be argued that it 
is particularly important that the authorities' approach to problem-solving is regarded as 
legitimate by the general public. 
Legitimacy is difficult to measure. One, rather pragmatic way to do it, is to look at 
how citizens assess the capacity of the authorities to handle tasks in specific public 
areas/policy fields. The way citizens in Norway assess public-sector problem-solving has 
formed the subject of a lot of studies, at both the central (Christensen and Lægreid 
2005) and local levels (Rose and Pettersen 1999, TNS Gallup 2006). We thus know that 
public assessments vary significantly (Huseby 1995; Strømsnes 2003) and particularly 
with regard to broad welfare areas, specific groups of variables have been tested and 
found significant as explanatory factors. We will use these groups of variables as our 
starting point for formulating assumptions about the public assessments of the security 
field. 
The most common group of variables used to explain variations in how citizens 
assess public-sector tasks and problem-solving are what in theoretical terms are named 
demographic features. One demographic variable often mentioned is education. The 
expectation is that the higher a person's level of education, the more he or she will trust 
the government – in our case to handle internal security (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 
2001:12). The reason for this is the cognitive factor, meaning that well-educated people 
know quite a lot about the political-administrative system, can distinguish its various 
components and understand how public services are organized and function, which 
supposedly furthers trust. Counter-arguments are that knowledge produces a more 
critical attitude towards government or that normative attitudes are more important 
than the cognitive aspect produced by a higher level of education.  
Other demographic variables are relevant. One of these is gender. Studies have 
shown that women in general support the public sector more than men (Lægreid 1993: 
96, 115). The reason for this seems to be that women’s core career base, some decades 
after entering the labour market on a broad basis, is the public sector. At the same time, 
growth in public expenditure has resulted in a higher tax burden for men, which may 
cause them to take a more negative attitude to public-sector institutions (Huseby 1995). 
One can therefore presuppose that women will trust the government more than men, 
and that this attitude will also apply to preventing and handling crises. In this group we 
will include a variable about the respondents’ civil status. If people are married and/or 
have a family of their own they tend to be more integrated in society but probably also 
more dependent on the public sector. Our argument is that both these features will 
make them more generally supportive towards the authorities' approach to problem-
solving, and specifically towards the prevention and handling of crises.  
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In our analysis we will include two variables referring to occupation. The first is 
linked to whether people are working, studying or living on various kinds of benefits. 
We will assume that people who are living on benefits or who are students are more 
dependent on the authorities for problem-solving and also on their ability to handle and 
prevent crises, and that therefore they will also have a more positive attitude towards 
them. The other variable here is linked to whether people are currently employed by the 
public sector. Some argue that it is possible to identify a “public-sector class”, which is 
generally more positively disposed towards public-sector institutions than those who 
work in the private sector (Lafferty and Knutsen 1984, Lafferty 1988, Rose and 
Pettersen 1999). Others say it remains unclear whether the division between the public 
and private sectors has become established as a dominant and permanent line of conflict 
in Norwegian political life (Valen et al. 1990). Nevertheless, we would expect perceived 
ability of public-sector crisis management institutions to be higher among people 
employed in the public sector than among those working in the private sector 
(Dunleavy 1989, Lægreid 1993: 113).  
Our last two demographic variables are age and place of residence. Generally, one 
would expect trust in government to increase with age; older people tend to be more 
collectively oriented, and whereas today’s younger generation has experienced a public 
sector that is either shrinking or blending in elements from the private sector, older 
people have experienced the build-up of the welfare state and will therefore tend to 
have more trust in government. We will assume that people living in cities will be more 
exposed to crises (or at least to the threat of crisis) than people living in more rural areas 
and will therefore be more dependent on the public sector's ability to handle them. In 
accordance with the arguments stated above, we will assume that this means that people 
living in cities will have a more positive attitude to the authorities’ abilities in this field 
than people living in more remote parts of the country. 
In scrutinizing public-sector tasks and problem-solving one explanatory factor that 
has gained much attention recently is what can broadly be termed trust. Trust is one of 
the most widely used concepts in contemporary social science research (Prakash and 
Selle 2004). It is, however, a multi-faceted and a highly contested and controversial 
term. We will include in our analysis two aspects that have been theoretically linked to 
trust by other researchers: one connected to general trust in society (Putnam 1993, 2001) 
and the other more specifically related to trust in the political and institutional system 
(Rothstein 1998). To measure general trust we will construct a variable called social trust. 
This variable is a combination of the responses to the following two statements in our 
survey: “There are few people I can fully trust” and “If I am not careful other people 
will exploit me.” These two questions say something about the respondents’ confidence 
in people in general. We will assume that if people mistrust their fellow citizens, and 
thus, according to our definition, have a low degree of social trust they will be more 
sceptical about the ability of public-sector organizations to manage tasks (Rothstein 
1998), this may also be true for internal security matters. On the other hand, lack of 
interpersonal trust may foster thoughts that collective public institutions could counter-
balance this lack, and that they can be trusted also in security questions. For Putnam 
religious activity is an important creator of social trust (Putnam 2001). Also in Norway 
this variable has shown to have some effect on peoples’ participation in elections and 
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also on their assessment of the authorities (Strømsnes 2004). Putnams’ argument is that 
people who attend religious meetings and services regularly are integrated in 
communities and this makes them more trustful towards society. We will assume that 
this is also so in Norway and that this sort of integration makes one more supportive 
towards the authorities. Strong religious integration can however foster scepticism 
towards a public sector that may be interpreted as threatening. The last variable we will 
include in this group - how respondents subjectively assess their own position in society - 
is in some ways connected to the former one. We will assume that people who regard 
themselves as holding a high rank in society will also be most integrated in society and 
therefore have the most positive attitudes to public task-solving – also in the particular 
field studied here.  
Trust in the political, institutional system will be measured as a combination of the 
respondents` self-confidence – indicated by the extent to which they believe they can 
affect political decisions – and whether they see politicians as trustworthy. By combining 
the responses to seven statements in the survey we have constructed a variable which 
we call political efficacy (see appendix for specification). Our hypothesis will be that a 
high degree of political efficacy will mean a high level of confidence in the authorities’ 
ability to prevent and handle internal security matters. Further we will include a variable 
which covers the respondents’ attitudes towards civil rights in this particular field (see 
appendix for specification). The assumption is that people who are more oriented 
towards civil rights and civil liberties will have less positive attitudes towards the 
government’s ability to handle and prevent risk. Their attitude may arise out of mistrust 
of the authorities’ ability to prevent and handle crises, necessitating the introduction of 
extraordinary measures.  
When citizens’ assessment of the public sector is scrutinized one group of variables is 
normally always included – namely political factors, like party affiliation and how 
respondents rank themselves according to a left-right index. In stable regimes like the 
Norwegian one, these factors tend to have rather weak explanatory power (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2005; Rose and Pettersen 1999). We will nonetheless include those 
variables in our analysis. When the survey was conducted the Centre-Left government 
which came into office in 2005 was one year into its term. We will assume that those 
who voted for the parties that formed this government will still have confidence in its 
ability to solve and handle problems in general and those concerning internal security in 
particular. The same argument applies to ranking the respondents on a right-left 
spectrum. Since, in Norwegian terms the government has a pronounced leftist 
orientation, we will assume that respondents who regard themselves as left-oriented will 
have a more positive attitude towards the ability of the authorities under this particular 
government. This assumption may, however, be contested citing the old wisdom that all 
leftists are sceptical towards established institutions and therefore will also have less 
confidence in the authorities' capability in general and in this field specifically. 
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C i v i l  s e r van t s  and  c r i s i s  managemen t  
Inside the civil service other factors will be of importance for understanding and 
explaining civil servants' assessment of their own capacity to cope with tasks and solve 
problems. These include their jurisdiction, their knowledge of the field in question, their 
contact with other actors inside this field and their overview of the public sector more 
generally. Many of these factors are related to what can broadly be defined as formal 
structure. Where actors are structurally located is a reflection of vertical and horizontal 
specialization. Therefore coordination is also a keyword here. Coordination is a basic 
challenge and always a central issue in the work of the public sector and this applies to 
internal security and crisis management as well (Peters 2004). The experience of recent 
accidents and crises has shown that inadequate organization and failure to coordinate, 
both at lower operative levels and higher administrative levels, is a recurring problem, 
and several studies and reports have corroborated this finding (Kettl et al. 2004, NOU 
2000:24, Wise 2002a). Thus, we will expect that coordinating capability will affect the 
perceived crisis management capability. In the fields of safety and security, tasks and 
responsibility tend to be spread among several sectors and levels and involve a large 
number of actors. As shown, in Norway the willingness to coordinate these fields better 
has been rather moderate. 
Internal security work and crisis management is by nature a fragmented, complex and 
disjointed area (Kettl 2004). This field throws up governmental complexities and 
dilemmas along both vertical and horizontal axes (Wise and Nader 2002). Generally it is 
difficult to coordinate the work of the various agencies, and government agencies tend 
to resist being regulated by other agencies (Wilson 1989). In the field of crisis 
management this problem is aggravated by the critical tasks the agencies are required to 
handle. Crisis management is a complex and fragmented area of government, and a 
growing number of cases and problems do not fit into the traditionally functional 
structure of polities. In organizational theory such problems are classified as “wicked 
problems” (Dror 1986, Harmon and Mayer 1986). Coordination between these is 
further complicated by the vertical nature of policymaking. As a rule, modern polities 
are organized according to the principle of purpose, which makes them vertical in nature 
and characterized by strong functional sectors – pillars or silos – and weak coordinating 
mechanisms (Kettl 2003). This implies that vertical governmental coordination or 
coordination within specific sectors may be good. When it comes to horizontal 
coordination, however, these systems face considerable problems, as reflected in the 
drive for increased cross-sectoral coordinative efforts in the post-NPM reforms 
(Halligan 2007). One often runs into the problem of negative coordination (Mayntz and 
Sharpf 1975), whereby the wish to coordinate is greater than the willingness to be 
coordinated. In the case of internal security the traditional problems of organizational 
coordination are multiplied and the stakes associated with success or failure vastly raised 
(Kettl 2004:66).  
The greatest difficulties of coordination in internal security and crisis management 
are not managerial ones. Fundamentally these issues are about politics, values and trust 
(Kettl 2004). Crisis management is a political activity and not just a technical exercise 
(Boin et al. 2005), and hence may potentially be the subject of turf wars and involve 
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interference and interaction with other political processes. Citizens expect full 
protection from all risks and look to their government to provide it. When problems 
occur they criticize public agencies and civil servants. Government officials can, 
however, not guarantee full protection to citizens. They can only do their very best. 
Another problem is that there is a trade-off between security and risk protection on the 
one hand and civil rights and  civil liberties on the other hand, an issue that has been 
intensively debated in many countries when tougher terrorist laws were proposed.  
We will in our empirical analysis of the variation in the civil servants’ perceptions of 
the ability to prevent and handle crises apply three sets of organizational or institutional 
features. According to an instrumental-structural perspective, decision-making processes in 
public organizations are either the result of strong hierarchical steering or of 
negotiations among political and administrative leaders (March and Olsen 1983). In 
addition, the formal structure of public organizations will channel and influence the 
models of thought and the actual decision-making behaviour of civil servants (Egeberg 
2003, Simon 1957). A major precondition for such effects is that leaders score high on 
rational calculation (Dahl and Lindblom 1953), meaning that they must have relatively 
clear intentions and goals, choose structures that correspond with these goals and have 
insight into the potential effects of the structures chosen. 
We focus on the importance of six structural variables for understanding the 
variation in perceived crises management capability among civil servants: administrative 
level, policy area, position, tasks, perceived coordination capability and management 
tools. Administrative level means whether civil servants are situated in ministries or 
agencies. Our expectation here is that civil servants in the ministries, because they have 
a higher structural position with a wider perspective, will perceive crisis management 
capability more positively than agency employees. A modifying element here might be 
that both agencies and ministries are involved but have different tasks and that civil 
servants in agencies are closer to crisis management and therefore have more insight 
into it. The relevance of policy area is measured by drawing a distinction between 
ministries and agencies more directly involved in crisis management in different sectors. 
We would expect civil servants in agencies and ministries with a specific crisis 
management responsibility to perceive their authorities' ability to prevent and handle 
crises as greater than people not belonging to such policy areas.  
Furthermore, the basis of our expectations is that diversity in structural position, 
seeing crisis management from different points of departure, and tasks having different 
knowledge bases, networks and activities will create variety in the assessment of crisis 
management. Our general assumption is that civil servants in leadership positions will 
generally give a more positive evaluation of their own organization's ability to handle 
and prevent crises than people without leadership responsibilities. Crisis management in 
central agencies is primarily attended to by people in leadership positions. Leaders are 
primarily meant to attend to or to be responsible for handling and preventing crises and 
they will therefore see them from a top hierarchical-coordinative perspective. In 
addition we would expect civil servants whose main tasks involve staff, regulation, 
control and auditing or coordination to have a more positive attitude to crisis 
management than civil servants with other tasks, because their daily work involves tasks 
that bring them more into contact with crisis prevention and handling. 
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Two more structural variables are used. Perceived coordination capability measures 
and whether civil servants see their own organizational unit as scoring high on 
coordination capacity or not. We would expect employees seeing such capability also to 
score higher on perceived preparedness to prevent and handle crises. The last variable is 
the use of diverse management tools, whether hard or soft, since extensive use of these 
tools may indicate a positive attitude towards renewal and therefore a perception of 
crisis management as part of modernization. 
The second perspective used in the analysis is the cultural-institutional one (Selznick 
1957). Such a perspective views the development of a public organization as based on 
historical traditions, path-dependency and informal norms and values (Krasner 1988, 
March 1994). Actors will think and act according to a logic of appropriateness, not one 
of consequence. The logic of appropriateness is a central feature of the cultural 
perspective. What is appropriate for a civil servant to do is defined by the institution to 
which he or she belongs and internalized through socialization (March and Olsen 1989). 
Common identities and a high level of mutual trust are central characteristics and make 
it possible to coordinate many activities in ways that make them mutually consistent. A 
high level of mutual trust tends to enhance appropriate behaviour and vice versa. In civil 
service systems with strong vertical sector relations, such as Norway, civil servants know 
what they are supposed to do and how to act and this creates and maintains trust 
relations within the different sectors, but it may also constrain trust and coordination 
among sectors (Fimreite et al. 2007). One would expect there to be a tension between a 
more traditional sectoral culture concerning crisis management and a new more holistic 
and collaborative one. 
Thus we would expect administrative culture and context to make a difference for 
perceived crisis management capacity. People with a high level of mutual trust between 
ministries and central agencies will generally be expected to make a more positive 
evaluation of these organizations' ability to handle and prevent crises. The same will be 
the case for people with a high level of identification with their own organization or 
with the central government in general. Another general expectation is that civil servants 
working in a policy area with a high level of conflict may be less likely to perceive crisis 
management positively, and that civil servants working in policy areas characterized by 
high political saliency will score higher on perceived preparedness to prevent and handle 
crises. 
Third, we need to be sensitive to the variety of demographic variables. Demography can 
be seen as part of an instrumental perspective, if we attend to the competence that the 
civil servants bring with them, the systematic recruitment and promotion of civil 
servants and their location in the organizational structure. But it may also be connected 
to the cultural perspective if we attend more to professional norms and values. Here, 
however, we will use it more as a separate perspective, primarily to explain variety in the 
perception of crisis management. The focus will be more on where civil servants come 
from and the social background they bring with them into the ministries and central 
agencies regarding norms, values and competence, than where they are located in the 
organizational structure or the administrative culture.  
The general reasoning here is that civil servants, through their socio-economic 
background or their individual careers have acquired certain norms and values that are 
CRISIS  MANAGEMENT  –  THE  CASE  OF  INTERNAL  SECURITY… WORKING PAPER  8  -  2007  
 
  19
relevant in their jobs. The more specific questions will be whether such differences in 
background systematically lead to variations in their perception of crisis management. 
Will civil servants who are older and have a longer tenure experience the various 
coordinative efforts differently to their younger, less experienced colleagues? Will there 
be gender differences, with women taking a more positive attitude to the authorities' 
ability to prevent and handle crises? And will educational background help to explain 
the variation? 
Da ta  and  me thodo l ogy  
The empirical data in this paper are based on two surveys, both conducted in 2006, one 
of the general public and one of civil servants. All civil servants with at least one year 
tenure, from executive officers to top civil servants in Norwegian ministries, and every 
third civil servant in the central agencies were included. The response rate in the 
ministries was 67 percent. 1,846 responded in the 17 ministries, ranging from 57 in the 
Ministry of Oil and Energy to 284 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1,516 persons in 
49 central agencies answered and the response rate was 59 percent. On average there 
were 31 respondents from each agency, ranging from 112 in the biggest agency to 1 in 
the smallest. The survey of the general public was based on a representative sample of 
Norwegian citizens between 18 and 79 years old. The questionnaire was sent by mail to 
2,700 individuals and 1368 responded. The response rate was 50 percent3.  
We take a broad empirical approach to the question of crisis management. The 
general public was asked the following questions: “What trust do you have in the 
Norwegian authorities’ ability to prevent various types of accidents and crises?” and 
“How competent do you think the Norwegian authorities are to handle various types of 
accidents and crises?” For both questions we listed three types of accidents and crises: a) 
Natural accidents such as avalanches, flooding and storms; b) Air, railways, roads and 
shipping accidents; c) Infections related to food, drinking water or epidemics such as 
bird flu or e.coli. For the first question the respondents were asked to rank their trust 
from 1 (very high trust) to 5 (very little trust). For the second question the options were 
ranked from 1 (very competent) to 5 (very incompetent). 
The civil servants were asked to answer the following questions: “How well prepared 
are the public authorities in your field of work to prevent and handle crises, accidents 
and disasters? (For example avalanches, storms, plane crashes, railway and shipping 
accidents, epidemics and terrorist attacks). We asked the respondents to rank their 
answers from 1 (very well prepared) to 5 (very badly prepared). 
 
                                                 
3 There is some under-representation of younger men in the survey. The data is from the survey on ‘Citizens attitude 
to public authorities and public activities 2006’, conducted by The Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD) 
and funded by the Norwegian Research Council. The data were collected by TNS Gallup and organized for 
research purpose by NSD. None of these institutions are responsible for the analyses or interpretations of the data 
that is done in this paper. 
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The dependent variables – prevention and 
handling of crises 
Table 2 reveals three main findings about how citizens assess the government's ability to 
handle crises. First, the general level of satisfaction is pretty high. In general, more 
people score high than low on trust and competence in the government when it comes 
to crisis management. Second, citizens have more confidence in the government’s ability 
to handle crises than to prevent them. This is the especially the case when it comes to 
natural disasters, but it also applies to some extent to transport accidents. Third, there 
are some variations between different types of accidents and crises. The government 
scores highest on trust and competence among citizens when it comes to handling 
transport crises and accidents. The citizens' assessment of the government as 
incompetent is highest when it comes to dealing with epidemics. This is not surprising, 
because the survey was conducted around the time that the giardia and e.coli epidemics 
took place. Regarding crisis prevention, the citizens were most sceptical about the 
government's ability to prevent crises arising from natural disasters. Crises following 
from flooding, storms and avalanches are not easy to prevent, in the view of a majority 
of citizens.  
 
Table 2. Citizens' assessment of the government’s ability to prevent and handle various types of crisis. 
2006.Percentage. 
 Type of crisis 
 Natural 
disaster 
Transport 
accident 
Epidemics 
Trust in government's ability to prevent crises: 
Very high trust 
High trust 
Neither high nor low trust 
Low trust 
Very low trust 
 
3 
28 
40 
21 
8 
 
6 
46 
32 
13 
3 
 
6 
39 
33 
16 
6 
How competent the government is to handle crises: 
Very competent 
Competent 
Neither competent or incompetent 
Incompetent 
Very incompetent 
 
7 
50 
35 
7 
2 
 
9 
60 
26 
5 
1 
 
7 
39 
38 
12 
4 
‘Don’t know’ is excluded (about 3 %). 
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Generally there is a high positive inter-correlation between citizens’ assessment of 
different types of accidents and crises and their evaluation of preventing and handling 
crises, i.e. there is a cumulative pattern. The average correlation is .54 (Pearson’s r. sig.: 
0.01). This means that if citizens’ responses generate high scores for one type of crisis 
they will do so for the other two types as well; in addition, a high level of confidence in 
the government's ability to prevent crises seems to go hand in hand with confidence in 
its ability to handle them. Thus there is a tight coupling between perceptions of 
different types of crisis and of prevention and reaction. 
Table 3 shows that civil servants generally report that they are well prepared to 
prevent and handle crises, accidents and disasters within their own field of work. Two 
thirds of the civil servants in the ministries and agencies who expressed an opinion on 
this issue said they were either well or very well prepared. One third of our respondents, 
however, answered ‘don’t know’ or ‘not relevant’. This relatively high score indicates 
that many civil servants work with tasks or in agencies that are not closely related to 
crises, internal security or accidents. 
 
Table 3. Perceptions among civil servants and citizens in general of how well prepared government 
authorities are to prevent and handle crises. 
 
 How well prepared civil servants in 
ministries and central agencies are 
to prevent and handle crises in 
their own field of work  
How citizens assess the 
government's ability to prevent and 
handle crises 
Very well prepared 
Well prepared 
Neither well nor badly 
prepared 
Badly prepared 
Very badly prepared 
16 
52 
24 
7 
2 
4 
47 
38 
10 
1 
The indicator for the citizens is constructed by adding up the values for the six variables used in Table 2 and dividing 
the total by the number of variables. The values were then recoded into 5 categories representing the scales on the 
original variables. The responses of the civil servants who said‘don’t know/not relevant’ were excluded (about 33 
%). 
 
The questions posed to the civil servants and to the general public are not identical, and 
this makes comparison between the two populations difficult. We have, however, 
constructed an index based on the different questions to the citizens that makes it 
possible to give a rough comparison with the profile of the civil servants in the 
ministries and central agencies. The main impression is that the citizens are more 
sceptical about the preparedness of government bodies than the civil servants are. While 
68 percent of the civil servants said they were well prepared to prevent and handle 
crises, only 51 percent of the citizens agreed with this. There is, however, not a great 
difference between the citizens and the public officials. In both groups only a small 
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minority said the government bodies were badly prepared. There is a need for 
comparison with other countries to reveal if Norway is a deviant case in this matter. 
 
Bivariate and multivariate analyses 
This section focuses on how the scores for the various independent variables, i.e. our 
indicators of demographic and political cultural features among the citizens and 
structural, cultural and demographic features among the civil servants, correlate with 
their perceptions of crisis prevention and handling. We first examine the bivariate 
relations between each set of independent and dependent variables and then do a 
multivariate analysis of the relative importance of various independent variables for the 
ability to prepare for and handle crises.4 We start by focusing on the citizens. 
 
Va r i a t i on s  i n  c i t i z en s ’  p e r c ep t i on  o f  g ove rnmen t  
c r i s i s  managemen t  c apab i l i t y  
Bivariate analysis 
Among the demographic variables we have included in our analysis four – gender, place of 
residence, occupational sector (public-private) and education – make no significant 
difference to the respondents' assessment of the authorities’ ability in this field. 
Occupational status makes a significant difference when it comes to perceptions about 
how the government is able to prevent and handle crises. People on benefits or disabled 
citizens are most critical, while students are most positive; people in the work force 
come in between. Civil status also tends to affect the citizens' perceptions: Those who 
are unmarried are most satisfied, while those who are divorced and widowed are most 
sceptical. Age also correlates with the perceptions: younger citizens respond more 
positively than older people do. 
Generally there is a strong relationship between the variables we have included under 
the label trust and how citizens report on the government’s ability to handle and prevent 
crises. Political efficacy, social trust and religiousness correlate strongly with all the 
dependent variables included in our analysis. Generally people who classify themselves 
in lower social positions are more sceptical than people from higher social positions. 
Attitudes towards civil rights have no significant correlation here. 
Political factors such as political party affiliation and left-right political orientation also 
make a difference. Right-oriented citizens are more sceptical towards the authorities’ 
abilities here than people categorizing themselves as left-oriented. If we look at party 
affiliation we find that people voting for either the big right-wing Progress Party or the 
small left-wing Red party are most sceptical. 
 
                                                 
4  For a description of how the independent variables are constructed, see Appendix. 
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Table 4. Variation between different groups of citizens’ assessment of the government’s ability to prevent 
and handle crises. Significant or non-significant correlation/differences.  
 Prevention of 
crises 
Handling of 
crises 
Prevention and handling 
of crises 
Demographic features:  
Gender 
Age 
Civil status 
Place of residence 
Occupational status 
Occupational sector 
Education 
 
- 
** 
* 
- 
** 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
* 
- 
** 
- 
- 
 
- 
** 
* 
- 
** 
- 
- 
Trust 
Civil rights attitude 
Political efficacy 
Social trust 
Religiousness 
Social class 
 
- 
** 
** 
** 
* 
 
- 
** 
** 
** 
- 
 
- 
** 
** 
** 
* 
Political factors 
Left-right orientation 
Political party affiliation 
 
** 
** 
 
** 
** 
 
** 
* 
-: Not significant: **: significance at .01 level; *: significance at .05 level 
In the analysis summarized in this table, ANOVA has been used for independent variables at the nominal level and 
Pearson’s r for independent variables at the ordinal level. Reported levels of significance are the significance of F 
from ANOVA and the 2-tailed significance of the correlation coefficient for Pearson’s r. 
 
Multivariate analysis  
We now turn to the question of the relative explanatory power of the different 
independent variables for citizens’ attitude to the government's ability to prevent and 
handle crises. We conducted a stepwise OLS regression analysis, using the same model 
for each dependent variable. Gender, place of residence, occupational sector and 
education were all non-significant in the bivariate analysis and were not included in the 
regression models. Three variables which were originally shown to be significant in the 
bivariate analysis – civil status, occupational status social class – displayed no stable 
significance in any of the three regression models. In the final analysis presented in 
Table 5 these variables were therefore excluded.5.  
The multivariate analyses confirm the main pattern revealed in the bivariate analysis. 
The general public does not vary much in its perception of the government's ability to 
                                                 
5 One variable without any significance in the bivariate analysis – civil rights attitude – did turn out to be significant in 
all three regression models and was therefore included again. The party affiliation variable is recoded as a dummy 
variable for the regression analysis. Voting for one of the three parties in government (the Social Democrats, the 
Socialist Left or the Centre Party) is coded as 0, while voting for all other parties is coded as 1. 
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prevent and handle crises. As shown in Table 5 more or less the same variables affect 
variation in both attitudes. The single most important variable is political efficacy. 
People with high political efficacy assess the authorities’ ability to prevent and handle 
crises as high.6  Social trust also contributes significantly to explaining variations in 
confidence in government ability to prevent and handle crises: People with a high level 
of social trust tend to assess the government's ability to prevent and handle crises as 
high. Political factors are important, too. Left-right political orientation makes a 
significant difference in attitudes to crisis management People categorizing themselves 
as right-leaning are more sceptical about the authorities’ ability to handle crises than 
people who categorized themselves as left-oriented.  
 
Table 5. Summary of regression equations by demographic and political-cultural features affecting 
citizens’ perceptions of the government’s ability to prevent and handle crises. Beta coefficients. Linear 
regression. 
 Prevention of crises Handling of crises Prevention and 
handling of crises 
Demographic features: 
Age 
 
.13** 
 
.09** 
 
.11** 
Trust: 
Civil rights attitude 
Political efficacy 
Social trust 
Religiousness 
 
.08* 
-.19** 
-.06* 
.08* 
 
.09** 
-.21** 
-.12** 
.06* 
 
.08** 
-.21** 
-.10** 
.07* 
Political factors: 
Left-right orientation 
Opposition position 
 
.05 
  .09* 
 
.08* 
.04 
 
.07* 
.07* 
Adjusted R2 .08 .10 .10 
**: Significant on .01-level; *: Significant on .05-level 
 
Party affiliation is also significant here. People voting for one of the three governing 
parties are more confident about the authorities’ ability to prevent crises.7 Age is also an 
important explanatory variable. Older people express the most scepticism towards the 
authorities in this field. Religiousness also has some explanatory power in all three 
models. People who are active in a religious context have more trust in the authorities’ 
ability both to prevent and handle crises. In contrast to the bivarate analysis we now see 
a significant effect of attitudes towards civil rights in the regression models. People who 
value such rights the most tend to have less confidence in the authorities’ abilities in this 
                                                 
6 The way our two dependent variables are coded –very high trust is 1 and very low trust is 5 – may cause some 
coefficients to be somewhat counterintuitive: high political efficacy and high social trust will both correlate 
negatively with high confidence in the authorities’ crisis-management ability. High religious activity is coded as 1, 
the same goes for positive attitudes towards civil rights and left-orientation. This should be borne in mind when 
reading the tables. 
7 The correlation between the variable Left-right-orientation and Opposition vs position is .45.  
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field. It is the interaction between this variable and political efficacy and right-left-
orientation that cause the significant effect of the civil rights attitudes here.  
The multivariate analysis reveals, as we assumed in the theoretical section, that 
variables categorized under the broad term trust are important for explaining variations 
in the public's perceptions about the authorities’ ability to prevent and handle crises. 
People with high political efficacy – which can be interpreted as high trust in political 
institutions – also, as assumed, have a high level of trust in the authorities’ ability to 
prevent and handle crises. This corresponds with other research in and on Scandinavian 
countries. Bo Rothstein's (1998) argument about the universal welfare state's ability to 
create general trust also seems to be relevant for the field of internal security. But social 
trust is also important. Both of the aspects highlighted by Putnam in his discussion of 
trust – confidence in fellow citizens (1993) and religious activity (2001) – explain, as we 
assumed, positive assessments of the ability to handle and prevent crises.  
One variable categorized under the broad label trust is civil rights attitudes. As we 
expected, people who value civil rights highly give the lowest assessment of the 
authorities’ ability. Their scepticism may be due to the fear that the authorities may 
easily infringe civil rights when adopting crisis-prevention and management measures 
(Kettl 2004).  Political factors were also shown to be important, maybe more so than 
we expected. Our assumption that left-oriented respondents tend to assess prevention 
and handling of crises in this field more positively than right-oriented respondents do 
gains some support. This is somewhat in contrast to the conventional wisdom that 
leftists are more system-sceptical than others. Our other political variable – namely 
whether the respondents voted for one of the three parties forming the Centre-Left 
government that took office in 2005 – may account for this. As already mentioned, this 
government has a pronounced leftist orientation. What we see here may therefore be 
the result of more of general confidence in the ability of the new government than 
specific confidence in government ability in this field. The effect of the variable 
opposition vs position supports such an interpretation.  
The demographic features we included in our analysis are somewhat less important 
than we assumed. Just one variable from this group has a significant affect on the 
assessments, and that is age. Moreover, this variable has the opposite effect of what we 
assumed. Older people are more sceptical about the authorities’ crisis-management 
ability than younger people are. Our theoretical argument was connected to old peoples’ 
general trust in the authorities. What we see here may therefore be the consequence of 
something else: older people's greater fear and uncertainty about unknown situations 
that they cannot control.  
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Va r i a t i on s  i n  c i v i l  s e r van t s '  p e r c ep t i on s  o f  t he i r  
c r i s i s -managemen t  c apab i l i t y  
Descriptive statistics 
If we focus on structural features there are great differences among civil servants in their 
assessments of how well prepared they are to handle and prevent crises in their own 
field of work. Officials working in ministries and agencies with special responsibility for 
internal security and crisis management, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Defence, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, the National 
Security Authority and the Food Safety Authority, have much greater confidence in 
governmental ability to handle and prevent crises than civil servants working in other 
ministries and agencies. So proximity seems to foster positive attitudes. 
 
Table 6. Variations in civil servants’ perceptions of how well prepared they are to prevent and handle 
crises, according to structural, cultural and demographic features. Significance. 
 Significance 
Structural features: 
Administrative level (ministry/agency) 
Policy area (internal security/other areas) 
Position (administrative leader or not) 
Tasks  
   -regulation, control, auditing 
   -coordination 
   -staff 
Perceived coordination capability 
Management tools 
 
- 
** 
** 
 
- 
- 
** 
** 
** 
Cultural features: 
Identification with own department 
Identification with own ministry/agency 
Mutual trust between ministry and agency 
Level of conflict in own policy area 
Political salience in own policy field 
 
** 
** 
** 
** 
- 
Demographic features: 
GenderAge 
Education 
Tenure 
 
* 
* 
** 
- 
-: Not Significant; ** Significant at .01 level; *: Significant at .05 level. 
In the analysis summarized in this table, ANOVA has been used for independent variables at the nominal level and 
Pearson’s r for independent variables at the ordinal level. Reported levels of significance are the significance of F 
from ANOVA and the 2-tailed significance of the correlation coefficient for Pearson’s r. 
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In addition, people in administrative leadership positions have more positive attitudes 
than other officials. The same is the case for civil servants who are satisfied with the 
coordination capability in their own field and those who work mainly on staff tasks. 
Adoption of modern management tools also tends to increase satisfaction with crisis 
management capability. Civil servants who report that they use modern management 
tools score higher in their assessment of crisis-management capability. There are, 
however, no significant differences between ministries and agencies, or between officials 
with regulation control and auditing or coordination as their main tasks compared to 
other civil servants. 
There are also significant variations involving various cultural features. Civil servants 
who identify strongly with their own department or agency have more confidence in 
crisis-management capability than people whose identification with their department or 
agency is low. A high level of mutual trust between ministries and agencies, and a low 
level of conflict in own policy area also tend to enhance assessments of crisis-
management capability. However, the level of public debate concerning own policy area 
does not correlate with assessments of crisis-management capacity. 
The demographic features reveal some differences between professions. Civil servants 
educated in military academies, physicians and veterinarians have the most positive 
attitudes while civil servants educated in the humanities are most sceptical. Men also 
tend to be more positive than women. In contrast to the general public the oldest civil 
servants score highest in their assessments of crisis-management capability. There is no 
significant effect of tenure. 
 
Multivariate analyses 
We now turn to the question of the relative explanatory power of the various 
independent variables for civil servants' views of their own ability to prevent and handle 
crises. We conducted a stepwise OLS regression analysis. All variables with significance 
in the bivariate analysis were originally included in the model. Level of conflict in own 
policy area, age and education, however, showed no stable significance in the regression 
model. In the final analysis, presented in Table 7, those variables were therefore 
excluded. Identification with own department and own agency was integrated into an 
additive index in the regression analyses8. 
The results from the multivariate analyses show first, that we are able to explain a fair 
amount of the variation in the civil servants' assessments of crisis-management 
capability. This is especially the case compared to the citizens. Second, policy area makes 
a significant difference. Civil servants working in agencies with special responsibility for 
internal security and crisis management are significantly more satisfied with their own 
crisis management capability than those working in other agencies. This might illustrate 
                                                 
8 The regression model includes an additive index measuring the level of identification with the administrative unit or 
the department/agency as a whole. The index is constructed as the average score across the two items on 
their five point ordinal response scale. High values on the index correspond to low identification. Position is included 
in the model as a single dummy with a value of 1 for "Assistant Director General and above”.  
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the problem of practicing the principle of responsibility. Giving responsibility for crisis 
management to each and every agency within their own policy area is likely to produce 
pretty low crisis-management capability. Agencies specializing in crisis management and 
internal security tasks report significantly higher crisis- management capability than 
other agencies.  
 
Table 7. Summary of regression equations by structural, cultural and demographic features affecting civil 
servants' perceptions of the government’s ability to prevent and handle crises. Beta coefficients. Linear 
regression. 
 Ability to prevent and handle 
crises 
Structural features: 
Policy area (internal security/other areas) 
Position  
Staff tasks 
Perceived coordination capability 
Use of management tools 
 
.19** 
-.04 
.07** 
.18** 
.05* 
Cultural features: 
Mutual trust 
Identification own department/own agency 
 
.19** 
.06* 
Demographic features: 
Gender 
 
-.05* 
Adjusted R2 .17 
**: Significant at .01-level; *: Significant at .05-level 
 
We also see a clear effect of another structural variable, coordination capability. Civil 
servants scoring high on coordination capability report a higher level of perceived crisis-
management capability than those who report problems of coordination. Having 
personnel work as a main task and use of management tools also seem to produce an 
effect, but it is much weaker. The same is the case for civil servants reporting that 
modern management tools, such as knowledge-based management, team-based 
management, value-based management, ethical guidelines, service declarations and 
benchmarking are important in their own field of work. The effect of leadership 
position is not significant in the final model but is significant if we exclude personnel 
tasks from the model. 
Third, there are also effects of cultural variables. In particular, a high level of mutual 
trust between ministries and central agencies tends to enhance perceptions of crisis- 
management capability. There is an effect of identification with own agency or 
department but this is weaker. Fourth, there is also a significant effect of one 
demographic variable, gender. Men tend to score higher on their assessments of crisis-
management capability than women. 
Generally our assumptions are supported for policy area, staff tasks, perceived 
coordination and use of management tools. There is particularly strong support for the 
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effect of policy area and coordination capability. By contrast, other structural features, 
such as position or having regulation or coordination as main tasks have little 
explanatory power. Regarding the cultural variables our assumptions about identification 
with own department or agency and mutual trust are supported. There is especially 
strong support for the importance of mutual trust between ministries and agencies. But 
level of conflict or political salience in own policy area does not have the effect that we 
assumed. When it comes to demographic variables gender makes a difference, while age, 
education and tenure do not. 
 
Discussion 
We have first shown that citizens have a rather high level of trust in the government’s 
ability to prevent and handle crises. Variations in their trust in government do not 
change much between prevention and handling of crises, and the profiles of the 
different types of crisis are pretty similar. This indicates that citizens' trust in 
government when it comes to internal security and crisis management is pretty 
generalized. If they have trust along one dimension and one area they also have trust 
along other dimensions and areas. This confirms the distinction Easton (1965) makes 
between diffuse and specific support, meaning that people either have a general attitude 
of trust or distrust towards the political-administrative system as such, including its basic 
institutions and actors, or else focus their attitudes in a more differentiated manner on 
specific institutions and actors. Our main results indicate that diffuse support or 
generalized trust in the Norwegian system is rather high. This is also in line with the 
findings of a broad empirical analysis of the crucial factors explaining citizens' attitudes 
to public service delivery in Norway (Christensen and Lægreid 2005). 
Second, given this main result, there are also perceptions showing that specific 
features and contexts of this policy area lead to differentiated reactions from citizens 
(Table 8). People are generally most positive when it comes to the government's ability 
to handle man-made crises and transport accidents and most sceptical regarding the 
prevention of natural disasters, such as avalanches, flooding and storms. This is in many 
ways a natural reaction and perception of risk. If one believes in modern technology, as 
many people do, it is easier to imagine the government coping with man-made crises 
than with natural disasters, which will normally be seen as unpredictable and difficult to 
handle. Important here is that climate change and the increased number of media 
reports of natural disasters are likely to raise people's level of fear.  
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Table 8. Citizens perceptions of different phases and causes of crises.    
  Cause of crisis 
  Man-made Natural based 
Prevention Medium score  
(transportation, infection) 
Low score  
(natural disasters) 
Phase of crises 
 
Handling High score  
(transportation) 
Medium score  
(nature, epidemics) 
 
Citizens have more confidence in government authorities' ability to handle crises than to 
prevent them and more confidence in crisis-management in the area of transport than in 
the area of epidemics. Again this seems plausible for two reasons. Crisis prevention will 
cost a lot of money and it is not easy to have enough resources to maintain an overall 
high level of prevention, particularly not when certain kinds of disasters happen seldom.  
But crisis prevention can also save a lot of money (see Wildavsky 2003). Handling crises 
that have already occurred is another matter, because that is more specific and it is 
therefore easier to focus resources and efforts. When citizens differentiate between 
sectors, they are obviously influenced by their experience that transport accidents 
happen quite rarely, while their specific experience with infectious diseases in Norway 
will colour their perceptions as will media coverage of scandals like mad cow disease 
and foot-and-mouth disease. 
Third, there are no big differences between the general public and the government 
authorities regarding their perceptions of crisis management. Only a small minority, 
both in the general public and among the civil servants, say that the government is very 
badly prepared. Civil servants seem to assess themselves more positively than citizens 
do. Again, this may reflect both a high level of trust in government among citizens in 
Norway, but also a competent civil service. Awareness of security issues also seems to 
have grown over the past decade, and both citizens and government officials are now 
less ‘innocent’ about what the potential dangers facing a modern society are. 
Fourth, when it comes to variations among citizens, political efficacy is the main 
explanatory factor. People who have less trust in political institutions are much more 
sceptical than those who have greater trust. Generally, variables linked to the label trust 
and political factors are more important than demographic factors in explaining 
variations in citizens’ assessments here, but age also makes a difference. We can sum up 
the results from the regression analysis by saying that older people, people with low 
political efficacy, people with low social trust, people who are politically right-oriented, 
people who pay a lot of attention to civil rights and people who engage in little religious 
activity, who assess civil rights highly and who vote for the opposition parties are most 
sceptical about the crisis-management capability of the government authorities. 
This is a rather mixed bag of explanatory variables, but with some systematic 
features. One is that social integration and social resources seem to foster general trust 
and also confidence in governmental ability to handle crises. People displaying such 
characteristics obviously feel less insecure and vulnerable, because they belong to social 
groups and have greater social competence and more insight into the importance of 
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collectivity when it comes to crisis management. Another is that citizens who are right-
leaning generally seem to be more sceptical about the public sector in general and to its 
crisis-management capacity more specifically. Without having actually asked them, one 
can imagine these citizens would prefer private actors to play a more central role in 
crisis management and will see individual responsibility as part of the equation. The 
third element is a concern for civil rights; something that one can imagine covers the 
whole political spectrum. These people will probably react strongly to excessive 
preventive measures, because they see them as being at odds with democratic values and 
individual rights. 
There are some notable contrasts between our expectations and our main findings, 
even though the main picture of the importance of trust variables is confirmed. Three 
demographic variables are worth mentioning. Education as a variable has a tendency to 
be important in many studies of people's attitudes, but not in this study. This may be 
due to a generally rather high educational level and less distinct differences, or simply to 
the fact that internal security is something most people know rather little about, 
however well-educated they are. Gender yields the opposite finding to the one we 
expected, which may mean that the proximity of women to the public sector is of less 
importance than the probable fact that men are more oriented to the technical aspect of 
internal security, while women attend more to the softer policy factors. Interestingly 
enough, and in contrast to what we expected, young people have more trust in the 
government's ability to prepare for and handle crises, which may be explained by the 
fact that young people are more exposed to and focused on the dangers facing a 
modern society. A final deviation that should be mentioned, from the trust category, is 
that social class has no effect on attitudes here, which may reflect a low level of class 
consciousness in an egalitarian society. 
Fifth, among the civil servants structural variables related to specialization and 
coordination have strong explanatory power, as expected. Civil servants working in 
regular agencies and ministries espousing the principle of responsibility for internal 
security and crisis management in own area and who experience big coordination 
problems give the lowest assessment of crisis-management capability. In contrast, civil 
servants in specialized agencies with particular responsibility for internal security and 
crisis management and who report good coordination believe they are most capable 
when it comes to crisis management. This shows that attention, related to formal 
structure and tasks, is important. Having internal security as one's main institutional 
focus is an advantage when it comes to both attention and resources, but it also 
increases knowledge about the preventive potential and handling ability. While actors 
with a lot of other tasks to attend to, and where internal security tasks are only one kind 
of task among many others, will perceive more problems. Generally speaking the 
existence of coordination problems indicates a fragmented structural context, which is 
problematic for internal security questions. 
In addition, the administrative culture must be taken into consideration. Mutual trust 
between ministries and subordinate agencies tends to enhance crisis management 
capability. This is what Bardach (1998) labels "smart practice," where the crucial point is 
not so much structural reorganization and new coordinative structures, but softer 
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cultural measures where different public organizations find pragmatic ways to 
collaborate based on a common cultural understanding.  
Overall, in addition to the most important independent variables of policy area, 
perceived coordination capability and mutual trust, there is also a group of factors with 
weaker but significant effects. Civil servants working on staff tasks, using diverse 
management tools, identifying strongly with their own agency and who are male, score 
relatively higher on their perceptions of crisis-management capability. Staff tasks often 
offer opportunities both for a closer relationship with the leadership and more insight 
into their concerns, and also decrease people's focus on daily case-work, which may 
increase positive perceptions of perceived capacity for handling internal security. Civil 
servants using diverse new management tools will probably be more preoccupied with 
the challenges of crisis management.  
If we compare our expectations with our findings, there are some interesting 
discrepancies. Even though many of the structural variables strongly confirmed the 
expected results, administrative level, position and some tasks did not. We expected that 
civil servants in ministries would be more prepared to prevent and handle crises than 
those in the agencies, but this turned out not to be the case. This may indicate that 
hierarchical overview is not more important than the proximity agency employees feel 
towards crisis management. That could also be partly the reason why administrative 
leaders do not score higher than employees lower down the hierarchy. And one reason 
why people working with staff tasks score higher than civil servants working with 
coordination could be that coordinative tasks may be both more difficult and more 
rewarding, so what is important is whether one feels that coordinative capacity is good, 
as shown in another variable. Of the cultural variables, the two variables concerning 
level of conflict and political salience do not show the expected results. But this may 
also be because it is not conflicts or saliency as such that are important, but rather 
whether these features are coupled to policy areas that have potential internal security 
challenges. None of the demographic variables show the expected results, and again 
men score higher than women on perceptions of preparedness. 
Conclusion 
For a small country that has not experienced many man-made or natural disasters, 
Norway has been rather preoccupied with internal security questions and reforms of 
crisis management. There seem to be some major reasons for this. One is that in a 
globalized world disasters and crises occurring elsewhere feel closer and insecurity thus 
increases, in other words, people feel that crises have something to do with them, 
whether Norwegians are involved or not. This is certainly the case for terrorist attacks 
and epidemics like SARS and bird flu, and even more so when Norwegians are directly 
involved, like in the tsunami disaster, which prompts an immediate response from the 
government. Domestic crises, like the e.coli bacteria epidemic, where children were the 
most vulnerable, also have a profound effect and prompt both immediate action and 
longer-term structural adjustments. 
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Very typical for the way Norway handles internal security concerns is that, even though 
commissions are assigned to work on the problems, the government uses a lot of 
resources and media coverage is intensive, the results of these processes are rather 
limited. This may indicate that path-dependency and sectoral concerns are relatively 
more important than really doing something in a new and coordinative way about crisis 
management. Crisis management obviously has difficulty staying high on the political 
agenda in a country like Norway where crises are less frequent than in countries with 
bigger populations, a greater likelihood of natural disasters, a greater terrorist threat, 
more ethnic, religious and other types of conflicts, etc. 
Our main finding from our survey of citizens' and civil servants' perceptions of crisis 
management is that preparedness is generally perceived to be on a high level while civil 
servants give it a more positive assessment than citizens do. Nevertheless, the difference 
between the two assessments is rather small, which may be a reflection of a 
homogeneous and safe society. There is no big gap between citizens and civil servants 
when it comes to assessment of the government’s crisis management ability. This 
indicates that there is not a significant legitimacy problem in this policy area, which has 
to be seen in relation to the fact that Norway has not faced a major disaster or 
catastrophe over the last decades. The main factors affecting citizens' crisis-management 
perceptions are to be found in several trust variables. Political efficacy, social trust and 
religiousness are all related to some kind of social capital and integration, which makes 
people feel more secure and have more confidence in the authorities' ability to handle 
crises. This seems to show that this policy area is somewhat special, because it is more 
closely tied than others to social resources and integration. With regard to the civil 
servants, the main finding seems to be that structural variables are important for 
explaining variations in perceptions, but this applies less to hierarchical ones and more 
to policy area and coordination capability. This may indicate that this policy area is so 
special that it requires special attention and a separate kind of organization. As among 
citizens mutual trust as a cultural variable is also important. 
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Append i x :  
 
The survey of citizens: 
The independent variables in Table 4 have the following values: 
 
Demographic features: 
Gender: 1 Man, 2 Woman;  
Age: Continuous;  
Civil status: 1 Unmarried, 2 Married/partner, 3: Separated/divorced, 4: 
Widow/widower; Place of residence: 1 Big city, 2 Suburb to big city, 3 Small city, 4 
Densely populated area;  5 Scattered settlements;  
Occupational status: 1 Working, 2: Student, 3: Retired 4: On benefits; Occupation: 1 
Managers/ politicians 2 Academics/professions 3 Technicians/occupation with shorter 
academic education 4 Office work 5 Sales/service/caring work 6 Work in 
agriculture/forests/fisheries, 7 Craftsmen, 8 Manuel worker/transport  8 Unskilled 
work; Occupational Sector: 1 Private firm, 2 Foundations/Civil society org./Interest 
org., 3 Local/regional government 4 Central government 5 Other public sector/partly 
public organization 6 Other;  
Education: 1 Primary school 2 Vocational training, 3 University/college 1-2 years, 4 
University/ college 3-4 years, University/college 5 years or more;. 
 
Trust: 
Civil rights attitude: Additive index based on responses to the following statements: a) 
Hold people in custody as long as one wants without taking them to court, b) Tap people's phone calls c) 
Stop people at random on the street and search them without any particular suspiscion. The index is 
constructed as the average score across the three items on their four point ordinal 
response scale. High values on the index correspond to high valuation of civil rights. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for the three item index is .685 
Political efficacy: Additive index based on responses to the following questions or 
statements: a) How interested are you in politics?, b) People like me have no opportunity to influence 
what the government does, c) Ordinary people have a lot of political influence d) I have a pretty good 
understanding of the important political  issues that our country faces, e) I think that most people are 
better informed about politics than I am, f) members of parliament try to keep their campaign promises, 
g) We can trust that civil servants in general do what is best for the country.  
The index is constructed as the average score across the seven items on their five point 
ordinal response scale. Some of the response scales are reversed to produce a consistent 
pattern of scores. High values on the index correspond to high political efficacy. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for the seven item index is .688. 
Social trust: Additive index based on responses to the following statements: a) There are 
only a few people I can really trust completely b) If you are not careful other people will take advantage 
of you.  
The index is constructed as the average score across the items on their five point ordinal 
response scale. High values on the index correspond to high levels of trust. Cronbach’s 
Alpha for the two item index is .667 
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Religiousness: How often do you attend church services or other religious meetings? 1 Several times a 
week, 2 Every week, 3 Two or three times a month, 4 Once a month 5 Several times a year 6 One or 
two times a year, 7 Less than once a year, 8 Never 
Social class:  In Norway there are groups that are more or less at the top of society and groups that are 
more or less at the bottom. Below you see a scale that goes from top to bottom. Where would you place 
yourself on that scale? The scale has 10 values from 1 (top) to 10 (bottom). 
 
Political Factors: 
Left-right orientation: In politics there is often talk of a cleavage between right and left. Below is a 
scale going from left (those who are politically very left-oriented) to right (those who are politically very 
right-oriented). Where would you place yourself on this scale? The scale has 10 values from 1 
Strongly left-oriented to 10 Strongly right-oriented. 
Political party affiliation: Which political party would you vote for if there was a general election 
tomorrow? 1 Red Election Alliance 2 Labour Party, 3 Progress Party, 4 Conservatives, 5 
Christians People's Party, 6 Centre Party, 7 Socialist Left Party, 8 Liberals, 9 Others, 10 
Don’t know, 11 would not vote. 
 
The dependent variables: 
 
The dependent variables used in table 4 and 5 are additive indexes. The indexes are 
constructed by adding the variables that are included and divide on number of variables. 
This means that the indexes will have five discreet values from 1 to 5, as the original 
variables that are included in the index also have. In the variable ‘Prevention of crises’ 
the attitudes towards the authorities’ ability to prevent crises in the area of a) nature, b) 
traffic/transport and c)  epidemics are included. In the variable ‘Handling of crises’ the 
citizens attitudes towards the authorities’ ability to handle crises in the three same areas 
are included. In the variable ‘Prevention and handling of crises’ includes all six variables 
that are used in the two previous indexes. 
 
The survey of civil servants: 
 
The independent variables in Table 6 have the following values: 
 
Structural features 
Administrative level: 1 Ministries, 2 Central Agencies 
Policy area:1 Ministries and central agencies with significant responsibility for internal 
security/crisis management: Ministry of Justice and Police, Ministry of Defence, 
Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Ministry of Health and 
Care, the Directorate of Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, the National Security 
Authority, the Coastal Administration, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime 
Directorate, the Railways Inspectorate, the Public Roads Administration, the Food 
Authority, the Directorate for Health and Social Affairs, the Pollution Control 
Authority, the Board of Health Supervision, The Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate, the Petroleum Safety Authority, the Radiation Protection Authority, the 
National Police Directorate ; 2 All other Ministries and Central agencies. 
Position: 1 Senior executive officer, 2 Head of office, 3 Assistant Director General 4 
Director General, 5 Secretary General/Head of agency 
Tasks: What are your main tasks? 
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  Personnel 1 Pay and personnel administration/organizational 
development/(re)organization   2 Other tasks;  
 Regulation: 1 Control, regulation, auditing, accounting, 2: Other tasks;  
 Coordination: 1 Coordination, 2 Other tasks. 
Perceived Coordination Capability: Additive index based on the following questions: 
How would you characterize coordination in your own field of work along the following 
dimensions: a) Coordination with other governmental bodies within own policy area, b) 
Coordination with governmental authorities within other policy areas, c) Coordination 
with local and regional government, d) Coordination with super-national 
bodies/international organizations, d) Coordination with private firms/civil society 
organizations/private-sector interest organizations. The index is constructed as the 
average score across the five items on their five point ordinal response scale. To avoid a 
significant loss of cases the “not relevant” alternative was set to the average value of the 
response scale before the index was constructed. High values on the index correspond 
to low levels of coordination. Cronbach’s Alpha for the five item index is .772. 
Management tools: Index based on the following questions: Related to the modernization 
and renewal work in the government administration several new reform tools and measures have been 
launched. How important are the following reforms/tools in your own field of work? Twenty-six 
different tools were listed and the respondents were asked to rank each of them on a 
scale from 1 Very important to 5 very unimportant/not used. A factor analysis 
differentiates between 6 different families of tools. In this paper we report on one factor 
that has a significant effect on the variation in the civil servants' assessment of their own 
capability to handle and prevent risk. This factor consists of the following reform tools: 
Knowledge-based management (factor loading .77), Team based management (factor 
loading .73), Value based management (factor loading .65), Ethical guidelines (Factor 
loading ..63), Service declarations (factor loading .60) and Benchmarking (factor loading 
.48).  The index is constructed as the average score across the six items on their five 
point ordinal response scale. To avoid a significant loss of cases the “not relevant” 
alternative was set to the average value of the response scale before the index was 
constructed. High values on the index correspond to low importance of the 
management tools.  
  
Cultural features: 
Identification:  Below we will ask you to report how strong or weak your identification is with the 
following organizational units? Four categories were mentioned: a) Own department b) Own 
agency/ministry c) Central government in general d) Own profession/education. The 
respondents were asked to answer on a scale from 1 (Very strong identification( to 5 
(Very weak identification). In this paper we use the two first units: 
 Own department: 1 (Very high identification) to 5 (Very low identification). 
 Own agency/ministry: 1 (very high identification) to 5 (Very low identification). 
Mutual trust: How would you characterize the level of mutual trust between your own agency and the 
superior ministry/own ministry and subordinate agencies? The respondents were asked to 
respond on a scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad). 
Level of conflict: To what degree would you say that your own field of work is characterized by 
agreement or disagreement? The respondents were asked to respond on a scale from 1 (Very 
high level of agreement) to 5 (Very high level of disagreement). 
Political salience: To what degree are the cases that you work on the object of public debate? 
The respondents were asked to answer on a scale from 1 (Very high degree) to 5 (Very 
low degree). 
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Demographic features: 
Gender: 1 Men 2 Women 
Age: 1- Under 35 years, 2- 35-54 years, 3- 55 years and more 
Education: 1 Military academy 2 Medical school/dental college/veterinarian, 3 Political 
science 4 Jurists, 5 Business economists, 5 Other education, 6 Natural 
science/mathematics/ civil engineer/architect 6 Bachelor' degree, 7 Economist, 8 Civil 
agronomy, 9 Other social science master's degree, 10 Humanities. 
Tenure: How long have you been working for central government? 1 5 years or less; 2 More than 
5 years. 
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